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1 Introduction
This paper studies a participation game in a mechanism to implement a public project.
Many interesting mechanisms have been constructed to solve the “free-rider” problem
in economies with public goods. In the case of a public project, Bagnoli and Lipman
(1989) and Jackson and Moulin (1992) designed mechanisms that implement eﬃcient
allocations. However, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) pointed out the importance of the
strategic behavior of agents as they decide whether or not to participate in the mech-
anisms. In the real world, as for example the participation problems in international
environmental treaties, agents often have the right to make such decisions, and they may
have an incentive not to enter the mechanism, hoping that other agents will participate in
the mechanism and provide a public good. This will generate another kind of a free-rider
problem.
Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) formulated a participation game in a mechanism to
implement a public project with identical agents. In this game, each agent simultaneously
chooses either participation or non-participation. If they enter the mechanism, they
contribute a ﬁxed amount that is common to every participant. The public good is
supplied only if the aggregate contribution of participants outweighs its production cost.
Only the participants bear the cost of the public good, while non-participants can beneﬁt
from the public good at no cost because the public good is non-excludable. Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1984) characterized pure and symmetric mixed Nash equilibria and showed
that an eﬃcient allocation is achieved at a Nash equilibrium but multiplicity of equilibria
may arise.
In this paper, we examine the participation problem which is similar to Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1984). However, there are several diﬀerences between our model and that
of Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984). First, we consider heterogeneous agents.1 Secondly,
1Maruta and Okada (2001) analyze a diﬀerent kind of heterogeneity from ours in the group formation3
we introduce a mechanism that implements the following allocation rules: (i) the public
project is undertaken only if the joint beneﬁt of participants from it is more than its
cost, (ii) the sum of payments from participants is equal to the cost of producing the
public project, (iii) every participant bears a positive cost share, and (iv) the cost share
of each participant is less than his willingness to pay for the public project. This kind
of allocation rule includes many cost-sharing rules. A proportional cost-sharing rule is
an example of such cost-sharing rules. Thirdly, we focus on not only Nash equilibria but
also strong equilibria (Aumann, 1959) and coalition-proof equilibria (Bernheim, Peleg,
and Whinston, 1987).
Our results are summarized as follows. We ﬁrst characterize the set of participants
at strict Nash equilibria. We show that there exists a strict Nash equilibrium and that
every strict Nash equilibrium supports an eﬃcient allocation in the participation game.
Secondly, we characterize strong equilibria and show that there is a strong equilibrium
in the participation game. Our main result is that the set of strict Nash equilibria, that
of strong equilibria, and that of coalition-proof equilibria coincide and that the sets of
these three equilibria are not empty. Moreover, there are eﬃcient allocations that are
supportable as the three notions of equilibria, and all the equilibrium allocations are
Pareto eﬃcient.
We also extend our model to the case with a multi-unit public good and that with
multiple projects. In these cases, the set of strict Nash equilibria, and that of strong
equilibria, and that of coalition-proof equilibria do not necessarily coincide.
Before the model is introduced, let us discuss the relationship between our work
and other work. First, we consider the possibility that agents form a coalition and
coordinate the participation decisions. We analyze the eﬀect of such coalitional behavior
on the participation decision. Earlier literature on participation games has focused solely
game.4
on Nash equilibria, disregarding the eﬀects (see, for example, Cavaliere (2001), Dixt and
Olson (2000), Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984), and Saijo and Yamato (1999)). In this paper,
analyses are presented of strong and Nash equilibria in the participation game. A strong
equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle that is immune to all possible coalitional deviations.
This is a very demanding equilibrium concept, and many games that are of interest
to economists do not have a strong equilibrium. However, the equilibrium exists in
the participation game studied in this paper. Furthermore, the set of strong equilibria
coincides with that of strict Nash equilibria and that of coalition-proof equilibria. This
is an interesting respect of our model, since strict Nash equilibria, strong equilibria, and
coalition-proof equilibria are based on diﬀerent concepts of stability and, in particular,
the set of strict Nash equilibria and that of strong equilibria are not in general related
by inclusion.
The second interesting point is relevant to participation games with local public
goods. Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1997a) established suﬃcient conditions for equiv-
alence between coalition-proof equilibria and strong equilibria. Applying their suﬃcient
conditions, it is straightforward to show that the two sets coincide in the participation
game with excludable public goods. However, we show that the equivalence between the
two sets of equilibria is also established even for the case with a non-excludable public
project. The existence of strong equilibria has been studied in the context of congestion
games, which can be interpreted as a sort of a participation game in mechanisms pro-
viding local public goods with congestion eﬀects. The congestion games satisfying some
conditions have a strong equilibrium (Holzman and Yone, 1997; Konishi, Le Breton, and
Weber, 1997c). Although the participation game studied in this paper is not a congestion
game, it has a strong equilibrium.
Thirdly, we mention the relationship between the participation game with a public
project and the other models in the context of the provision of a pure public good. In5
a participation game in a mechanism producing a perfectly divisible public good, there
exists a case in which strict Nash and coalition-proof equilibria exist but strong equilibria
do not. (Saijo and Yamato, 1999; Shinohara, 2003). Similar phenomena have also been
observed in standard games of the voluntary contribution of a perfectly divisible public
good. Therefore, in the games of the provision of perfectly divisible public goods, the set
of strict Nash equilibria, that of strong equilibria, and that of coalition-proof equilibria
are not necessarily equal. This paper shows that the equivalence of the three sets of
equilibria does not necessarily hold in a participation game with a multi-unit public
good and that with multiple projects, which are generalizations of the participation
game with a public project. However, in the participation game with a public project,
there is a strong equilibrium, and all three sets of equilibria coincide. This means that
the existence and equivalence results depend on the setting with one and only one public
project. In other words, it hardly holds in the context of the provision of public goods
that a strong equilibrium exists and the sets of strict Nash, strong, and coalition-proof
equilibria all coincide.
2 Participation game in a mechanism implementing
a public project
We consider the problem of undertaking a (pure) public project and distributing its cost.
Let n be the number of agents. We denote the set of agents by N = f1;:::;ng. Let
y 2 f0;1g be the public project. If the project is undertaken, then y = 1, and y = 0 if
not. Let µi > 0 denote agent i’s willingness to pay for the project. Let xi ¸ 0 denote a
transfer from agent i. Each agent i has a preference relation which is represented by the
quasi-linear utility function Vi(y;xi) = µiy ¡ xi. The cost of the project is c > 0.
In this paper, we assume that there exists a mechanism that implements a Pareto6
eﬃcient and individually rational allocation rule. We consider a two-stage game. In
the ﬁrst stage, each agent simultaneously decides whether or not he participates in the
mechanism. In the second stage, following the rule of the mechanism, only the agents
who selected participation in the ﬁrst stage decide the implementation of the project and
the distribution of its cost. First, we formally deﬁne the outcome of the second stage.
Let P be a set of participants, and let (yP;(xP
j )j2N) be the outcome of the second stage
when P is the set of participants. We denote µP =
P
j2P µj for all sets of participants P:
µP is the sum that agents in P are willing to pay for the public project. For each subset
P of N, #P means the cardinality of the set P.
Assumption 1 For every set of participants P, the allocation to the participants (yP;(xP
j )j2P)
satisﬁes
(i) µP > c if and only if yP = 1,




(iii) µi > xP
i for every i 2 P, and
(iv) xP
i > 0 for every i 2 P if and only if yP = 1.
Condition (i) means that the public project is undertaken if and only if the sum that
the participants are willing to pay for the project exceeds the project cost. Condition (ii)
requires that the expenses paid by the participants be equal to the project cost when the
project is undertaken. This is called the budget balance condition. Clearly, conditions (i)
and (ii) imply that (yP;(xP
j )j2P) is a Pareto eﬃcient allocation only for the preferences
of agents in P. Item (iii) is the individual rationality condition, which means that the
payoﬀ of every participant after entering the mechanism is greater than 0, when the
project is undertaken. Condition (iv) requires that every participant bear a positive cost
share if and only if the public project is undertaken.7
Several desirable allocation rules satisfy the conditions. The proportional cost-sharing










c if yP = 1,
0 otherwise.
In this paper, we are not concerned with the implementation problem of an allocation
rule that satisﬁes (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) in Assumption 1. However, there is a mechanism
in which the above allocation rule is attainable in equilibria. For example, Jackson and
Moulin (1992) constructed mechanisms which implement a class of cost-sharing rules
satisfying all the above conditions in subgame perfect equilibria and undominated Nash
equilibria.
Assumption 2 Let P µ N be a set of participants. We assume xP
i = 0 for all i = 2 P,
and every non-participant can also consume yP.
This assumption expresses the non-excludability of the project. In this assumption,
participants bear the cost share for the project, but non-participants do not. In spite of
this, non-participants can beneﬁt from the project.
Given the outcome of the second stage, the participation-decision stage can be re-
duced to the following simultaneous game. In the game, each agent i simultaneously
chooses either si = I (participation) or si = O (non-participation), and then the set
of participants is determined. Let P s be the set of participants at an action proﬁle
s = (s1;:::;sn). Then, each agent i obtains the utility Vi(yPs;xPs
i ) at the action proﬁle
s. That is, if the public project is undertaken, then participants share the cost of it as
deﬁned in Assumption 1. Each non-participant can beneﬁt from the public project at
no cost. On the other hand, if the project is not carried out, then the payoﬀs for both
participants and non-participants are zero. We call this reduced game a participation
game and formally deﬁne it as follows.8
Deﬁnition 1 (Participation game) A participation game is represented by G =
£
N; Sn = fI; Ogn; (Ui)i2N
¤
, where Ui is the payoﬀ function of i, which associates a real
number Ui(s) with each strategy proﬁle s 2 Sn: if P s designates the set of participants
at s, then Ui(s) = Vi(yPs;xPs
i ) for all i.
Our attention is limited to the pure strategy proﬁles.
The notions of equilibria of the participation game are deﬁned as follows. The Nash
equilibria of the participation game are deﬁned as usual. First, a deﬁnition is given for
a strict Nash equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 2 (Strict Nash equilibrium) A strategy proﬁle s¤ 2 Sn is a strict Nash
equilibrium if, for all i 2 N and for all b si 2 S n fs¤
ig, Ui(s¤
i;s¤
¡i) > Ui(b si;s¤
¡i).
Before deﬁning strong equilibria, some notation is presented. For all D µ N, denote
the complement of D by ¡D. For all coalitions D, sD 2 S#D denotes a strategy proﬁle
for D. For all sN 2 Sn, denote sN by s.
Deﬁnition 3 (Strong equilibrium) A strategy proﬁle s¤ 2 Sn is a strong equilibrium
of G if there exist no coalition T µ N and its strategy proﬁlee sT 2 S#T such that
Ui(e sT;s¤
¡T) ¸ Ui(s¤) for all i 2 T with strict inequality for at least one i 2 T.
A strong equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle at which no subset of agents, taking the
strategies of others as given, can jointly deviate in a way in which all members are at
least as well oﬀ and at least one of its members is strictly better oﬀ. Obviously, all strict
Nash equilibria and all strong equilibria are Nash equilibria. However, the set of strict
Nash equilibria and that of strong equilibria are not necessarily related by inclusion.
Example 1 Let N = f1;2;3g, µ1 = µ2 = µ3 = 3=4, and c = 1. The cost is distributed
among participants in proportion to their willingness to pay for the project. The payoﬀ
matrix of this example is depicted in Table 1, where agent 1 chooses rows, agent 2 chooses9
columns, and agent 3 chooses matrices. The ﬁrst entry in each box is agent 1’s payoﬀ,
the second is agent 2’s, and the third is agent 3’s. There are two types of Nash equilibria.
One is the Nash equilibrium with two participants, and the other is the Nash equilibrium
with no participants. Only the Nash equilibria with participation of two agents are strict
and strong.
hInsert Table 1 here.i
3 Strict Nash equilibria of the participation game
In this section, we characterize the sets of participants attained at strict Nash equilibria.
Since the payoﬀs to agents depend on the sets of participants, we introduce the following
notations for the sake of convenience.
Deﬁnition 4 A payoﬀ function of i, ui: 2N ! R+, is deﬁned as follows:






i )yP if i 2 P;
µiyP otherwise:
The set of feasible allocations of the economy is deﬁned as A:
A =
(






Assumption 3 µN > c.
Deﬁnition 5 An allocation (y;(xj)j2N) is called Pareto eﬃcient if there is no allocation
(b y;(b xj)j2N) 2 A such that Vi(b y;b xi) ¸ Vi(y;xi) for all i 2 N and Vi(b y;b xi) > Vi(y;xi) for
some i 2 N.
We, hereafter, consider a case in which Assumption 3 holds. By Assumption 3, the
public project is undertaken at all Pareto eﬃcient allocations. In the next Lemma, we
characterize the sets of participants supported as strict Nash equilibria.10
Lemma 1 A set of participants P is supported as a strict Nash equilibrium of the
participation game if and only if µP > c and µP ¡ µi · c for all i 2 P.
Proof. Let P be a set of participants that satisﬁes µP > c and µP ¡µi · c for all i 2 P,
and let (yP;(xP
j )j2N) denote the allocation when P is the set of participants. Then, the
following conditions are satisﬁed:
ui(P) = µi ¡ x
P
i > 0 = ui(P n fig) for all i 2 P, and
ui(P) = µi > µi ¡ x
P[fig
i = ui(P [ fig) for all i = 2 P:
Therefore, P can be supported as a strict Nash equilibrium.
Secondly, we suppose that P is a set of participants at a strict Nash equilibrium.
Then, we have ui(P) > ui(P n fig) for all i 2 P and ui(P) > ui(P [ fig) for all i = 2 P.
If µP · c, then we have ui(P) = ui(P n fig) = 0 for all i 2 P, which is a contradiction.
Thus, it must be satisﬁed that µP > c. Since µP > c, ui(P) = µi ¡ xP
i for all i 2 P. If
µP ¡ µj > c for some j 2 P, then the agent j has an incentive to deviate from I to O
because uj(P n fjg) = µj > µj ¡ xP
i = uj(P). This is a contradiction. Therefore, we
must have µP ¡ µi · c for all i 2 P. ¥
In the following lemma, we verify that there is a strict Nash equilibrium in the
participation game.
Lemma 2 There exists a strict Nash equilibrium in the game G under Assumption 3.
Proof. By Lemma 1, we show the existence of a set of participants P µ N that satisﬁes
the condition
µP > c and µP ¡ µi · c for all i 2 P; (1)
in order to prove this statement. Let T be a set of participants such that:
T 2 arg min
QµN
µQ such that µQ > c: (2)11
Note that there is at least one set of participants R satisfying µR > c by Assumption
3. Now, suppose that µT ¡ µi > c for some i 2 T. Since µT > µTnfig > c, µT is not the
minimal number, which contradicts (2). Therefore, it holds true that µT ¡ µi · c for all
i 2 T. ¥
In the participation game, there may be a non-strict Nash equilibrium. For example,
a Nash equilibrium at which no agents choose I is obviously not strict in Example 1. Note
that, if non-strict Nash equilibria exist, then the project is not done in the equilibrium,
and the allocations supported as the non-strict Nash equilibria are Pareto-dominated by
that attained at a strict Nash equilibrium. The following proposition shows that the set
of strict Nash equilibria coincides with the set of Nash equilibria that support eﬃcient
allocations.
Proposition 1 In the participation game, a strategy proﬁle is a strict Nash equilibrium
if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium at which an eﬃcient allocation is attained.
Proof. First, we prove that every strict Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that
supports an eﬃcient allocation. Obviously, every strict Nash equilibrium is a Nash
equilibrium. Hence, we need to show that every allocation achieved at a strict Nash
equilibrium is Pareto eﬃcient. Assume that (yP;(xP
j )j2N) is the allocation attained at a
strict Nash equilibrium. Note that Vi(yP;xP
i ) = µi ¡ xP
i for all i 2 P and Vi(yP;xP
i ) =
µi for all i = 2 P. Suppose, on the contrary, a feasible allocation (b y;(b xj)j2N) Pareto
dominates (yP;(xP
j )j2N). It must be satisﬁed that Vi(b y;b xi) = µi for all i = 2 P because
µi is the greatest payoﬀ of agent i in A. Hence, there is at least one participant j 2 P
such that Vj(b y;b xj) > Vj(yP;xP
j ). Let J µ P be a set of such participants and let
"j = Vj(b y;b xj) ¡ Vj(yP;xP
j ) > 0 for all j 2 J. Since Vj(yP;xP
j ) = µj ¡ xP
j > 0 for
every j 2 J, we must have b y = 1: otherwise, Vj(b y;b xj) = 0. Then, we learn that12
Vj(b y;b xj) = µj ¡ xP
j + "j for all j 2 J. By the argument above,
b xj = 0 for all j = 2 P;
b xj = x
P
j ¡ "j for all j 2 J, and
b xj = x
P
j for all j 2 P n J.
Summing up b xj for all j 2 N yields
P





j2J "j = c ¡
P
j2J "j < c,
which contradicts the feasibility of (b y;(b xj)j2N). Hence, (yP;(xP
j )j2N) is Pareto eﬃcient.
Secondly, each Nash equilibrium that supports an eﬃcient allocation is a strict Nash
equilibrium. Let s 2 Sn be a Nash equilibrium that attains an eﬃcient allocation. Denote
the set of participants at s by P s. Since the project is done at eﬃcient allocations, we
have µPs > c. Furthermore, it is satisﬁed that µPs ¡ µi · c for all i 2 P s: if there is
an agent j 2 P s such that µPs ¡ µj > c, then agent j has an incentive to deviate from
s because uj(P s n fjg) = µj > µj ¡ xPs
j = uj(P s). This contradicts the idea that s is a
Nash equilibrium. It follows from Lemma 1 that s is a strict Nash equilibrium. ¥
4 Strong equilibria in the participation game
4.1 Equivalence between strict Nash equilibrium and strong
equilibrium
First, we show that the set of strong equilibria coincides with that of strict Nash equi-
libria.
Proposition 2 In the participation game with a public project, a strategy proﬁle is a
strong equilibrium if and only if it is a strict Nash equilibrium.
Proof. (() Let s¤ 2 Sn denote a strict Nash equilibrium. Let P ¤ be the set of
participants at s¤. Let T µ N be a coalition and sT 2 S#T be a strategy proﬁle of T.13
We show that some members of T are worse oﬀ by jointly deviating from s¤
T to sT.
We take a partition of T consisting of four sets: T ¤
I \ TI, T ¤
I nTI, TInT ¤
I , and Tn(T ¤
I [ TI),
where T ¤
I ´ fi 2 Tjs¤
i = Ig and TI ´ fi 2 Tjsi = Ig. The set of participants in (sT;s¤
¡T)
is (P ¤ n(T ¤
I nTI))[(TInT ¤
I ). We denote this set by e P. In the strict Nash equilibrium s¤,
ui(P
¤) = µi ¡ x
P¤
i > 0
for all i 2 P ¤, and
ui(P
¤) = µi > 0
for all i = 2 P ¤. We calculate the payoﬀs of the members of T after the deviation. To do
so, we need to consider the following two cases: µ e P · c, and µ e P > c.
First, consider the case in which µ e P · c. In this case, the public project is not
undertaken at (sT;s¤
¡T). Since the payoﬀs of the members of T at (sT;s¤
¡T) are given by
ui(e P) = 0 for all i 2 T, we obtain the following four inequalities:
ui(P












¤) > ui(e P) for all i 2 Tn(T
¤
I [ TI):
Therefore, the deviation cannot raise the members’ payoﬀs.
Next, let us consider the case in which µ e P > c. Note that the public project is
undertaken at (sT;s¤
¡T). If T ¤
I nTI is not empty, then it follows from Lemma 1 that
µP¤ ¡ µi · c for all i 2 T ¤
I n TI. Thus, we have µP¤ ¡ µT¤
I nTI · c. Because µ e P =
µP¤ ¡ µT¤
I nTI + µTInT¤
I > c, we must obtain µTInT¤
I > 0. This implies that TInT ¤
I is non-
empty. It is satisﬁed that ui(P ¤) > ui(e P) for all i 2 TInT ¤
I because ui(e P) = µi ¡ x
e P
i
for every i 2 TInT ¤
I . Therefore, if T ¤
I nTI is not empty, the deviation does not improve
the members’ payoﬀs. If T ¤
I nTI and TInT ¤
I are empty sets, then P ¤ = e P holds. Clearly,14
no member of T is better oﬀ by the deviation. If T ¤
I nTI is empty and TInT ¤
I is non-
empty, then none of the agents in TInT ¤
I can improve their payoﬀs by the deviation since
ui(P ¤) = µi > µi¡x
e P
i = ui(e P) for all i 2 TInT ¤
I . Consequently, s¤ is a strong equilibrium
of G.
()) Let s¤ be a strong equilibrium, and let P ¤ be the set of participants at s¤. If
µP¤ · c holds, then we have ui(P ¤) = 0 for all i 2 N. When all agents jointly choose I,
then every agent i has the payoﬀ ui(N) = µi ¡ xN
i , which is positive by Assumption 1
and 3. This is a contradiction. Hence, we have µP¤ > c. It also holds that µP¤ ¡ µi · c
for all i 2 P ¤: if there exists an agent j 2 P ¤ such that µP¤ ¡ µj > c, then agent j
has an incentive to deviate from s because uj(P ¤ n fjg) = µj > µj ¡ xP¤
j = uj(P ¤).
This contradicts the idea that s¤ is a strong equilibrium. Therefore, s¤ is a strict Nash
equilibrium. ¥
Although the sets of strict Nash equilibria and strong equilibria are subsets of that
of Nash equilibria, it is not evident whether the two sets coincide. The two-player
game depicted in Table 2 shows that the set of strong equilibria does not necessarily
coincide with that of strict Nash equilibria. In this game, (B1;B2) is the only strict Nash
equilibrium, and a strong equilibrium is uniquely determined by (A1;A2). Hence, the
two sets have an empty intersection, and both of them exist. However, from Proposition
2, the set of strict Nash equilibria coincides with that of the strong equilibria in the
participation game. An implication of Proposition 2 is that the two non-cooperative
equilibrium concepts based on diﬀerent types of stability coincide in the participation
game with a public project.
Note that a weakly dominated strategy may be used at a strong equilibrium.2 In
the example in Table 2, A1 is weakly dominated by B1, and so is A2 by B2. However,
2For every agent i, a strategy si 2 S is weakly dominated in the game G if there exists another
strategy s0
i 2 S such that Ui(s0
i;s¡i) ¸ Ui(si;s¡i) for all s¡i with strict inequality for some s¡i.15
(A1;A2) is a strong equilibrium of the game. In the participation game with a public
project, every strong equilibrium is a strict Nash equilibrium, which implies that the
strong equilibrium does not consist of weakly dominated strategies in the participation
game.
hInsert Table 2 here.i
By Lemma 2, Proposition 1, and Proposition 2, the set of strong equilibria and the
set of Nash equilibria that support eﬃcient allocations coincide, and a strong equilibrium
exists in the participation game.
Corollary 1 The set of strong equilibria coincides with the set of Nash equilibria that
support an eﬃcient allocation in the participation game.
Corollary 2 The participation game has a strong equilibrium.
These results contrast with those of a participation game with a perfectly divisible
public good. Saijo and Yamato (1999) introduced a model of voluntary participation
in a mechanism to provide a perfectly divisible public good. We ﬁnd from their results
that the Nash equilibria of the game are not always Pareto eﬃcient. Hence, if agents
have the right to decide either participation or non-participation in the mechanism, then
eﬃcient allocations are not necessarily attained even if the mechanism is constructed to
implement eﬃcient allocations in its equilibrium. It was also proven by Shinohara (2003)
that the game does not always have a strong equilibrium.3 In contrast, in a participation
game with a public project, there exist strong equilibria, and an eﬃcient allocation of
the economy can be supported as the equilibrium.
3In the participation game with a perfectly divisible public good, the provision of the public good
increases as the number of participants rises. In the case in which the number of participants at a
Nash equilibrium is suﬃciently small, if all non-participants at the Nash equilibrium jointly switch to
participation, then each of them can be better oﬀ. For details, refer to Shinohara (2003).16
4.2 Coalition-proof equilibria and strong equilibria
The notion of a coalition-proof equilibrium was introduced by Bernheim, Peleg, and
Whinston (1987) and is known as a reﬁnement of Nash equilibria based on the stability
against self-enforcing coalitional deviations. It is deﬁned by using the notion of restricted
games. A restricted game is a game in which a subset of agents play the game G, taking
strategy proﬁles of agents outside the subset as given. We formally deﬁne it as follows.
Let T ( N and t = #T. Let ¯ sNnT 2 Sn¡t. A restricted game Gj¯ sNnT is a game in
which the set of agents is T, the set of strategy proﬁles is St, and the payoﬀ function for
each i 2 T is the function Ui(¢; ¯ sNnT) that associates a real value Ui(sT; ¯ sNnT) with each
element sT in St such that: Ui(sT; ¯ sNnT) = Vi(y;xi), where (y;(xj)j2N) is the allocation
when agents play (sT; ¯ sNnT) in G.
Deﬁnition 6 A coalition-proof equilibrium (s¤
1; :::; s¤
n) is deﬁned inductively with re-
spect to the number of agents t:
² When t = 1, for all i 2 N, s¤
i is a coalition-proof equilibrium for Gjs¤
Nnfig if
s¤
i 2 argmax Ui(si;s¤
Nnfig) s:t: si 2 S.
² Let T µ N with t = #T ¸ 2. Assume that coalition-proof equilibria have been
deﬁned for all normal form games with fewer agents than t.
² Consider the restricted game Gjs¤
NnT with t agents.
– A strategy proﬁle s¤
T 2 St is called self-enforcing if, for all Q ( T, s¤
Q is a
coalition-proof equilibrium of Gjs¤
NnQ.
– A strategy proﬁle s¤
T is a coalition-proof equilibrium of Gjs¤
NnT if it is a
self-enforcing strategy proﬁle and there is no other self-enforcing strategy
proﬁle b sT 2 St such that Ui(b sT; s¤
NnT) ¸ Ui(s¤
T; s¤




NnT) for some i 2 T.17
Coalition-proof equilibria are deﬁned as the Pareto eﬃcient frontier within the set of
self-enforcing strategy proﬁles. The self-enforcing strategy proﬁles are recursively deﬁned
with respect to the number of agents in coalitions. At a self-enforcing strategy proﬁle
of N, no proper coalition of N can coordinate its members’ strategies in a way in which
all members of the coalition are at least as well oﬀ and at least one of them is strictly
better oﬀ, and no proper subsets of the coalition further deviate in a self-enforcing way.
Note that every strong equilibrium is a coalition-proof equilibrium and every coalition-
proof equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, but a coalition-proof equilibrium is not always
a strong equilibrium. However, in the participation game with a public project, every
coalition-proof equilibrium is a strong equilibrium.
Proposition 3 In the participation game with a public project, a strategy proﬁle is a
strong equilibrium if and only if it is a coalition-proof equilibrium.
Proof. By the deﬁnitions of coalition-proof equilibria and strong equilibria, every strong
equilibrium is a coalition-proof equilibrium. We show that a coalition-proof equilibrium
s 2 Sn is a strong equilibrium. Suppose, on the contrary, that s is not a strong equilib-
rium. Since the proﬁle s is a coalition-proof equilibrium, it must be a Nash equilibrium.
If s is a strict Nash equilibrium, then it is also a strong equilibrium by Proposition
2. Therefore, s must be a non-strict Nash equilibrium. By Proposition 1, s does not
support an eﬃcient allocation. Because of this, we have Ui(s) = 0 for all i 2 N. By
Lemma 2, there is at least one strict Nash equilibrium in this game. Denote a strict Nash
equilibrium by s¤. Note that s¤ must be a coalition-proof equilibrium; hence, it must
also be a self-enforcing strategy proﬁle. By Proposition 2, s¤ is a strong equilibrium, and
we have Ui(s¤) > 0 for every i 2 N. Since s is Pareto-dominated by the self-enforcing
strategy proﬁle s¤, s is not coalition-proof, which is a contradiction. Therefore, s is a
strong equilibrium. ¥18
Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1997a, 1997b, 1997c) studied the no-spillover game,
in which the strategy spaces of all players are common. In the no-spillover game, for each
player i, his payoﬀ is not aﬀected by the choices of those players who choose strategies dif-
ferent from i.4 These authors established suﬃcient conditions for the existence of strong
equilibria and the equivalence between coalition-proof equilibria and strong equilibria in
the game. One of the suﬃcient conditions is the condition of positive population mono-
tonicity: the payoﬀ of every player i increases if more players choose the same strategy as
players i.5 Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1997a) proved that, if the population mono-
tonicity condition is satisﬁed, the set of coalition-proof equilibria coincides with that of
strong equilibria in every no-spillover game. Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1997b) also
showed that strong equilibria exist in games in which the set of pure strategies for each
player consists of two alternatives. Although the participation game is a no-spillover
game, it does not satisfy positive population monotonicity because the payoﬀs of non-
participants decrease when a participant switches to non-participation and the project is
then not undertaken. It was also proven by Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1997c) that,
if a no-spillover game satisﬁes negative population monotonicity6 and anonymity7, then
the game has a strong equilibrium. The participation game with a public project does
not satisfy negative population monotonicity. Furthermore, the participation game is
4The no-spillover game is formally deﬁned as follows: a game is called a no-spillover game if, for all
pairs of agents i; j 2 N, for all strategy proﬁles s 2 Sn, and for all strategies for i, b si, if sj 6= si and






b si; sj; sNnfi;jg
¢
.
5The game satisﬁes positive population monotonicity if, for all i;j 2 N and for all s 2 Sn, if si 6= sj,
then Uj(si;sj;sNnfi;jg) · Uj(sj;sj;sNnfi;jg).
6The game satisﬁes negative population monotonicity if, for all i;j 2 N, for all s 2 Sn, if si 6= sj,
then Uj(si;sj;sNnfi;jg) ¸ Uj(sj;sj;sNnfi;jg).
7The condition of anonymity requires that the payoﬀ of a player depend only on the number of
players who choose the same strategy. The formal deﬁnition is as follows: a game is anonymous if, for
all s; b s 2 Sn and all i 2 N, if si = b si and #fj 2 Njsj = ¯ sg = #fj 2 Njb sj = ¯ sg for all ¯ s 2 S, then
Ui(s) = Ui(b s).19
not anonymous because agents are heterogeneous and the payoﬀs of participants depend
not on the number of participants but on their composition in our model. Although the
conditions of Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber are not suﬃciently met in our game, the
set of strong equilibria coincides with that of coalition-proof equilibria and is not empty.
The following theorem summarizes the results that have been obtained so far.
Theorem In the participation game, the set of strict Nash equilibria, that of strong
equilibria, that of coalition-proof equilibria, and the set of Nash equilibria that support
eﬃcient allocations coincide.
Remark 1 Let us consider an allocation rule that satisﬁes (ii), (iv), and the following
conditions:
(i)0 For all sets of participants P, µP ¸ c if and only if yP = 1.
(iii)0 For all P µ N and for all i 2 P, µi ¸ xi. (weakly individual rationality)
In the participation game in a mechanism to implement this allocation rule, the set of
strong equilibria contains that of strict Nash equilibria, and they do not always coincide.
Furthermore, a strict Nash equilibrium does not necessarily exist in the game. However,
the game has a Nash equilibrium at which eﬃcient allocations are attained, and every
set of participants at Nash equilibria that support eﬃcient allocations is characterized
as P µ N with µP ¸ c and µP ¡ µi < c for all i 2 P. We can show that the set of
Nash equilibria that support eﬃcient allocations, that of strong equilibria, and that of
coalition-proof equilibria coincide in a similar way to Propositions 2 and 3. Therefore,
the equivalence between a strong equilibrium and a coalition-proof equilibrium can be
obtained in a case in which the allocation rule satisﬁes (i)0 and (iii)0 instead of (i) and
(iii).20
5 More general participation games: examples
In Section 4, we prove that the set of strong, strict Nash, and coalition-proof equilibria
coincide in the participation game with a public project. In this section, we consider
two natural generalizations of the participation game with a public project: participation
games with a multi-unit public good and participation games with multiple public projects.
The purpose of this section is to investigate whether or not the results in Section 4 can
be extended to the more general participation games.
5.1 Participation games with a multi-unit public good
There is one private and one public good. We assume that the public good is produced
in the units of integers only. Let l > 1 be a natural number. Let Y be a subset of Rl
+
such that Y =
©
(y1;:::;yl) 2 f0;1gljy1 ¸ y2 ¸ ¢¢¢ ¸ ylg: in this model, at most l units
of the public good can be produced. Let c > 0 be the cost of producing one unit of
the pubic good. Each agent i has a preference relation that is represented by the utility




with each element (y;xi) in Y £ R+, where µk
i > 0 denotes agent i’s willingness to pay
for the k-th unit of the public good.
Example 2 Let N = f1;2;3;4g. Let l = 2. Suppose that µ1
i = 2 and µ2
i = 0:8 for all
i 2 N and c = 1. Assume that a mechanism implements the equal cost-sharing rule.
Let P be a set of participants. Note that one unit of the public good is produced if
#P = 1, and two units of the public good are provided if #P ¸ 2. Table 3 shows the
payoﬀs to participants and non-participants in this example. From the table, we can
easily ﬁnd that one and only one agent enters the mechanism at all strict Nash and
coalition-proof equilibria. However, these Nash equilibria are not strong equilibria, since
three non-participants at the Nash equilibrium can gain higher payoﬀs if all of them21
jointly deviate from non-participation to participation; thus, a strong equilibrium does
not exist in this example. Therefore, the set of strict Nash equilibria and that of strong
equilibria do not necessarily coincide in the participation game with a multi-unit public
good.
hInsert Table 3 here.i
5.2 Participation games with multiple public projects
Let us consider an economy with two public projects (A and B) and their corresponding
mechanisms. The set of strategies of every agent is denoted by S = fA;B;Og: A
means participation in the mechanism undertaking the public project A, B designates
participation in the mechanism implementing the public project B, and O represents
participation in neither mechanism. The public project A is produced from c units of
the private good, and B is produced from ®c units of the private good, where ® > 0. The
production costs of public projects A and B are shared by participants equally. Every
agent i has a preference relation that is represented by the quasi-linear utility function
µA
i yA+µB
i yB ¡xi, where yA 2 f0;1g and yB 2 f0;1g represent the public projects A and
B, and µA
i and µB
i denote the willingness to pay for public projects A and B, respectively.




2 = µ > 0, 2µ > ®c > µ > c, and 1 < ® < 2,
say ® = 1:5, c = 1, and µ = 1:25. The payoﬀ matrix is depicted in Table 4. In this
example, the cost of project B is higher that that of project A. Project A is undertaken
if one or two agents choose A, and project B is undertaken only if two agents choose B.
Thus, it is a Nash equilibrium for the two agents to select B. This strategy proﬁle is
also coalition-proof, because (A;A) is the only deviation that improves payoﬀs of the two
agents, but the deviation is not self-enforcing. However, strategy proﬁle (B;B) is not
strong since the deviation from (B;B) to (A;A) is proﬁtable. Hence, in the participation
game with two projects, there may be a coalitional deviation that increases payoﬀs of its22
members but is not self-enforcing. Therefore, the set of strong equilibria does not always
coincide with that of coalition-proof equilibria.
hInsert Table 4 here.i
The above examples indicate that the equivalence among the three sets of equilibria
does not always hold in the games with a discrete public good and multiple public
projects. Therefore, it is an essential assumption to the equivalence result that there is
one and only one public project in the economy.
Remark 2 Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1997a) showed that the set of coalition-
proof equilibria and that of strong equilibria coincide in many games of the provision of
local public goods. (Refer to Greenberg and Weber (1993) and Konishi, Le Breton, and
Weber (1998) for games of the provision of local public goods.) However, in games of
the provision of non-excludable public goods, the equivalence rarely holds. The above
results show that the two equilibrium sets coincide in the participation game with a
public project, while they may fail to coincide if the public good can be provided in
multiple units or if there are multiple projects.
6 Conclusion
We have investigated a participation game in a mechanism providing a public project. We
characterized the strict Nash, strong, and coalition-proof equilibria of the participation
game. We showed that the set of strict Nash, strong, and coalition-proof equilibria
coincide and that all of the equilibria exist. We ﬁnd from the result that the participation
in a public project is in a class of games in which the three diﬀerent non-cooperative
equilibria coincide. Furthermore, an eﬃcient allocation of the economy can be achieved
as various notions of equilibria, and only the eﬃcient allocations are supportable as the
equilibria. These results are contrasted with those in the models of providing a perfectly23
divisible public good, such as a participation game with a perfectly divisible public good
and the voluntary contribution of a perfectly divisible public good. The equivalence
between the sets of coalition-proof and strong equilibria is established, although the
conditions of the earlier literature have not been suﬃciently satisﬁed in our model. This
paper clariﬁed the conditions that the set of coalition-proof equilibria and that of strong
equilibria coincide in the game of the provision of non-excludable public goods.
Although eﬃcient allocations are attained at the equilibria, the allocations are less
desirable from the viewpoint of equity. In Example 1 on page 8, there exist strict Nash
equilibria at which two agents enter the mechanism. Obviously, these Nash equilibria
support eﬃcient allocations. However, in these equilibria, only two agents bear the cost
for the public project, and the other agent enjoys the project at no cost. To achieve
more equitable allocations, it is desirable that all agents participate in the mechanism.
It is left for future researches to study the possibility of constructing the mechanism, in
which all agents participate at equilibria.
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4 0; 0; 0
O 0; 0; 0 0; 0; 0
O
Table 1: Payoﬀ matrix of Example 1
1n2 A2 B2
A1 2; 2 0; 2
B1 2; 0 1; 1
Table 2: An example in which the set of strong equilibria and that of strong equilibria
are disjoint.27







Table 3: Payoﬀs of Example 2
1n2 A B O
A 0:75; 0:75 0:25; 1:25 0:25; 1:25
B 1:25; 0:25 0:5; 0:5 0; 0
O 1:25; 0:25 0; 0 0; 0
Table 4: A participation game with two public projects